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The Effect of the Number of Entangled Photons on the Number of Coincidences Rate, Bell's Inequality and the Error Rate by the Delphi Program

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Authors' contributions

This work was carried out in collaboration among all authors. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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ABSTRACT

Quantum cryptography is a science that relies on the use of a protocol designed to exploit quantum mechanical phenomena to achieve the secrecy of cryptographic keys. This work aimed to generate a quantum key based on polarization-entangled photon pairs; to eliminate the error by implementing the BB89 protocol using the Delphi language program in order to obtain a high degree of security. The results explain the effect of the number of EPR photons pair running from

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(500-10000) photons on the number of coincidences, expected error and Bell's parameter discussed as; Total coincidences of the Bell – CHSH increases with increasing of EPR pairs, and *S* values were stable when EPR pairs were increased, there was a small random change in the expected error rate (in case of no eavesdropping).This study concludes thatTotal coincidences of the Bell and expected error are affected by the number of entangled photons.The increasing of the length of key must increase the number of EPR and decrease the Error and Bell's value must be stable.

Keywords: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Einstein- Podolesky- Rosen (EPR).

1. INTRODUCTION

The main goals of cryptography are the encryption and decryption of messages to render them unintelligible to the third party. These goals can be obtained when the sender ("Alice") and the recipient ("Bob") both have a secret Key using some cryptographic algorithm. The key distribution becomes possible if they communicate by using the emerging technology of quantum cryptography (QC), or quantum key distribution (QKD). In 1991 Ekert proposed the Einstein- Podolesky- Rosen (EPR) [1] "entangled" two-particle states used to implement a quantum cryptography protocol whose security was based on "Bell's inequalities" [2,3].

For a review, see, for example, [4,5].

In the not-too-distant future, quantum computing is anticipated to transform the paradigm of computing [6]. Researchers are faced with the challenge of creating new coding methods that would hold up in the era of quantum computing. Also, previous studies [7]. Thisshowed that in order to provide security strength in key distribution, most conventional cryptography depends on mathematical complexity and the irrational amount of time required to crack the approach. However, it won't work if the procedure for distributing secret keys is faulty. Peter Shor published an algorithm in 1994 that can efficiently factorize big integer numbers using the principles of a quantum computer, posing a threat to some of the classical encryption. Recently, quantum key distribution (QKD) has drawn more attention from researchers as a potential solution to the key distribution issue. Using the principles of quantum physics, it has been shown that QKD is theoretically capable of providing communication that is 100 percent secure. Theoretically, QKD has been demonstrated to be capable of offering communication that is completely secure based on the laws of quantum mechanics.

In addition, a previous study [8] showed the quantity of data points the system can gather in a limited amount of time has a significant impact on the security of real-world quantum key distribution (QKD). Obtaining positive secret keys now requires block lengths in the order of 104 bits for state-of-the-art finite-key security evaluations. However, in fact, it can be very challenging to meet this condition, particularly in the case of entanglement-based satellite QKD, where the overall channel loss can reach 70 dB or higher. Here, we present an enhanced finitekey security analysis that lowers the required block length for typical channel and protocol parameters by 14% to 17%. Practically speaking, this reduction might spare weeks of
measurement time and resources for measurement time and resources for entanglement-based satellite QKD, bringing space-based QKD technology closer to being a reality. We demonstrate the recently revealed Micius QKD satellite's ability to generate positive secret keys with a 105-security level using the improved analysis as an application. Using the commercial Optic System TM optical simulation, a framework for modeling and simulating quantum key distribution algorithms is presented. This simulation methodology is based on the empirical components of a quantum key distribution. The BB84 process was also simulated using the noise immune switching distribution and different security attack scenarios. In terms of the experimental arrangement, the effectiveness of the visual simulator's component parts was also examined. These simulations were used to examine how the experimental optical components affected the quantum key distribution process [9].

According to [8], and [10] the most recent development in quantum cryptography is quantum key distribution. There are numerous QKD protocols, including BB84, B92, Ekert91, COW, and SARG04, the earliest of which was created in 1984. The BB84 protocol's work was discussed, and after that, a new protocol that is a variation of the BB84 protocol was proposed.

Next, the design of the simulation setup was discussed. Finally, the BB84 protocol's performance was compared with the proposed protocol, and the latter performed significantly better in terms of amplitude and error estimation. Both the BB84 protocol and the new protocol's simulation design employed an object-oriented methodology.

The uses of quantum information science are expanding into better and more expansive aspects of the upcoming technologies. In the fields of quantum computation and cryptography, there have already been a number of groundbreaking physical products and promising outcomes. One of the more developed fields of quantum mechanics is quantum cryptography, and the equipment is already on the market. The current level of quantum cryptography is still being researched in numerous ways in order to reach the heights of digital cryptography. However, because it uses both hardware and software, quantum cryptography is extremely difficult. The success of quantum cryptography experiments is delayed by the lack of an effective modeling tool for designing and analyzing the experiments. Therefore, in order to achieve a high level of security, a framework based on polarization-entangled photon pairs utilizing the Ekert protocol is used in this paper. Additionally, the error is eliminated by implementing the BB89 protocol using a Delphi language application.

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Aurther Ekert [11-13] proposed the entanglement-based quantum cryptography method which explained as; a source that emits entangled photon pairs (in the Bell state) in opposite directions is placed Between Alice and Bob, [2]. Alice and Bob receive a photon and analyze its polarization on a different, random basis and exchange information about the bases used [14,15]. After that branched the results into two groups: thefirst group when they used the same basis of measurement used as keys of cryptographyand the second when used adifferent basis used to check the eavesdropping. Since they cannot be utilizedfor, the key transfer anyway, and make the findings of those measurementspublic. With the use of these figures, they may determine whether the experimental data they collected is in violation of the so-called Clauser- Horne- Shimony- Holt (CHSH) inequality [11]. This is a different interpretation of Bell's inequality, which was inspired by the EPR paradox. When Alice and

Bob are measuring in distinct bases according to the Ekert protocol, the CHSH inequality provides a constraint for classically coupled particles that is maximally violated by quantum correlations. Calculating the violation of the CHSH inequality will allow Alice and Bob to be certain that no eavesdropper was present as these quantum correlations are the source of information utilized to derive the key [11].

The state of EPR photon pairs thatare emitted in a single state of polarization used to carry out the key distribution is explained by Maki. [16]:

$$
|\psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|-\rangle_1|\uparrow\rangle_2 - |\uparrow\rangle_1|\rightarrow\rangle_2)
$$
 (1)

After the photons have separated, Alice and Bob, measure of incoming particles individually and arbitrarily selected bases and record the results in one of three bases that are created by rotating the basis along the z-axis at different angles:

$$
\Phi_1^a = 0, \Phi_2^a = \frac{\pi}{4} and \Phi_3^a = \frac{\pi}{8} \text{ for Alice}
$$

and by angles

$$
\Phi_1^b = 0, \Phi_2^b = -\frac{\pi}{8} and \Phi_3^b = \frac{\pi}{8}
$$
 for Bob.

The analyzers for Alice and Bob are indicated by the superscripts "a" and "b," respectively. There are two outcomes for each measurement. +1 (the photon is measured in the first polarization state of the selected basis) and -1 (the photon is measured in the other state of the selected basis), and each measurement has the ability to expose one piece of information.

The amount:

$$
E(\Phi_i^a, \Phi_j^b) = P_{++}(\Phi_i^a, \Phi_j^b) + P_{--}(\Phi_i^a, \Phi_j^b) - P_{++}(\Phi_i^a, \Phi_j^b) - P_{+-}(\Phi_i^a, \Phi_j^b)
$$
 (2)

E: is the correlation coefficient of the measurements performed by Alice in the basis rotated by Φ_i^a and by Bob in the basis rotated by Φ_j^b . Here denotes $P_{xx}(\Phi_i^a, \Phi_j^b)$, the probability that the result ± 1 has been obtained in the basis defined by $\mathbf{\Phi}_i^a$ and ± 1 in the basis defined by Φ_j^b . According to the quantum rules [16]:

$$
E(\Phi_i^a, \Phi_j^b) = -\cos[2(\Phi_i^a - \Phi_j^b)]
$$
\n(3)

And $E(\Phi_1^a, \Phi_1^b) = E(\Phi_3^a, \Phi_3^b) = -1$ (4)

We can define the quantity S that iscomposed of the correlation coefficients when Alice and Bob used analyzersof different orientation:

$$
S = E(\Phi_1^a, \Phi_3^b) + E(\Phi_1^a, \Phi_2^b) + E(\Phi_2^a, \Phi_3^b) - E(\Phi_2^a, \Phi_2^b)
$$
 (5)

The same S is generalized by the Bell theorem proposed by Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt, and known as the CHSH inequality [17]. Quantum mechanically S must be equal:

$$
S = -2\sqrt{2} \tag{6}
$$

2.1 Quantum Calculation of the Correlations in Bell's Theorem

A state vector $|\Psi\rangle$ which describedby quantum calculation for the probability of a spin-1/2 particle passing through a Stern- Gerlach apparatus (SGA) oriented at angle θ is given by Guillermin and Dedeurwaerdere [17]:

$$
P_{\Psi}(\theta) = |\langle \theta | \Psi \rangle|^2 \tag{7}
$$

 $\ket{\theta}$ is formed by rotating a "spin up "state about the Y-axis:

$$
|\theta\rangle = e^{-i\theta\sigma} \langle 1 \rangle \tag{8}
$$

Recall that:

$$
\sigma_x = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \sigma_y = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & -i \\ i & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \sigma_z = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}
$$
 (9)

And:

$$
|\uparrow\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, and |\downarrow\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}
$$
 (10)

 $P_{\Psi}(\theta)$: is the probability that may be rewritten as: [18]:

$$
P_{\Psi}(\theta) = \langle \Psi | \theta \rangle \langle \theta | \Psi \rangle \tag{11}
$$

The probability of simultaneous passage through SGAs at θ_a and θ_b by the particles after a little algebra, described by the spin singlet state [19]:

$$
|\Psi_{1,2}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\uparrow_1,\downarrow_2) - |\downarrow_1,\uparrow_2\rangle)
$$
\n(12)

$$
\text{is: } P_{ab} = \langle \Psi_{1,2} | \pi_{\theta_a}^{(1)}, \pi_{\theta_b}^{(2)} | \Psi_{1,2} \rangle \tag{13}
$$

The projection operators in this expression correspond to particles 1 and 2. After a little algebra, one finds:

$$
P_{ab} = \frac{1}{4} \left[1 - \cos(\theta_a - \theta_b) \right] = \frac{1}{2} \sin^2 \left[\frac{(\theta_a - \theta_b)}{2} \right]
$$
 (14)

in this work photons are involved along so that the optical polarization property, an expression for the probability will also be established; however, it will only apply to the scenario of a source of photon pairs emitting to two receivers that measure photons by filters (analyzers) then detectors, as shown in Fig. 1.

The polarization state of the two photons, after passage through the filters, is:

$$
|\Psi_{1,2}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (r_1 |r_2\rangle + |l_1\rangle |l_2\rangle)
$$
\n(15)

r and l represent the photon polarizations being right and left circular and the subscripts 1 and 2 represent the photons having frequencies v_1 and $v₂$ respectively [16]. A change of basis to linear polarization states $|x\rangle, |z\rangle$ allows the state vector $|\Psi_{1,2}\rangle$ above to be rewritten as:

Fig. 1. Correlations measurements between Alice's and Bob's detection events for different choices for the detection bases (indicated by the angles θa and θb for the orientation of their polarizing beam splitter, PBS) lead to the violation of Bell's inequality [20]

$$
|\Psi_{1,2}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|z_1\rangle |z_2\rangle + |x_1\rangle |x_2\rangle)
$$
\n(16)

(16)

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bigiers the latter state ab The measurement of joint linear polarization by polarizer's at angles θ_a and θ_b to the z-axis projects the latter state above onto the two polarization states:

$$
|\theta_a\rangle = \cos\theta_a |z_1\rangle + \sin\theta_a |x_1\rangle |\theta_b\rangle = \cos\theta_b |z_2\rangle + \sin\theta_b |x_2\rangle
$$
 (17)

The probability for passage through the twopolarization analyzers quantum mechanically is given by:

$$
P_{1,2}(\theta_a, \theta_b) = \left| \langle \theta_a | \langle \theta_b | \Psi_{1,2} \rangle \right|^2 \Rightarrow P_{1,2}(\theta_1, \theta_2) = \frac{1}{2} \cos^2(\theta_a - \theta_b)
$$
 (18)

By the way, the one useful form of the Bell inequalities (which is usually tested in experiments) is due to Clauser and Horne, and is defined by Guillermin and Dedeurwaerdere [17]:

$$
S = \frac{P_{12}(\theta_a, \theta_b) - P_{12}(\theta_a, \theta_b') + P_{12}(\theta_a', \theta_b') + P_{12}(\theta_a', \theta_b')}{P_1(\theta_a') + P_2(\theta_b')} \le 1
$$
\n(19)

S: known as the Bell parameter. By using:

$$
P_{1,2}(\theta_1, \theta_2) = \frac{1}{2}\cos^2(\theta_a - \theta_b)
$$
 for any θ_1 and θ_2 ,

and : $P_1(\theta) = \frac{1}{2}$, $P_2(\theta) = \frac{1}{2}$ $P_2(\theta)$ = $\frac{1}{2}$, for any θ (may be θ_1 or θ_2), then the following is defined :

$$
F = \frac{P_{12}(\theta_1, \theta_2)}{P_1 + P_2} = \frac{\frac{1}{2}\cos^2(\theta_1 - \theta_2)}{\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}} = \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{4}\cos[2(\theta_1 - \theta_2)]
$$
\n(20)

Then S may be rewritten as:

$$
S = F_1 + F_2 + F_3 + F_4 \le 1
$$
\n(21)

where the indices 1, 2,3 and 4 correspond to the angle combinations:

 $(\theta_a, \theta_b), (\theta_a, \theta'_b), (\theta'_a, \theta_b)$ and (θ'_a, θ'_b) , respectively. By substituting for each F above in S expression yields [15]:

$$
S = \cos(2(\theta_a - \theta_b) - \cos(2(\theta_a - \theta_b') + \cos(2(\theta_a' - \theta_b) + \cos(2(\theta_a' - \theta_b'))... \leq \frac{4}{2} = 2
$$

$$
\therefore S \leq 2.
$$
 (22)

S: represent the Clauser and Horne form of Bell inequalities, which adapted in the Ekert protocol for the quantum transmission in the quantum key distribution process, the correlation coefficients E_1, E_2, E_3 and E_4 defined in absolute by:

$$
|E| = \cos[2(\theta_1 - \theta_2)] \tag{23}
$$

for any $θ_1$ and $θ_2$, where the indices 1, 2, 3 and 4 are as for the F's above.

2.2 The Error Correction Stage

The error will strike Alice's and Bob's strings during quantum transmission, whichis parameterized by the quantum bit error rate (QBER) defined as the number of errors divided bythe total size of the cryptographic key. For example, a QBER of 0.5 implies Alice and Bob have completely uncorrelated strings [21].

The BB89 protocol (BB89 protocol is a modified version of the original protocol BB84 to produce a working QC apparatus at IBM in October 1989. It is called "BB" after the names of its inventors Bennett and Brassard) is adapted to eliminate the errors in the raw of quantum transmission (RQT) strings. Due to its simplicity and capability of eliminating relatively high error rates are adapted in this work [22].

The input of this stage is the sifted key (which is an erroneous string output from the quantum transmission stage) and the output of the error elimination stage is the final key, which should be identical for both Alice and Bob atthe successful implementation for theerror elimination stage. The final key is smaller than the sifted key.

2.3 Simulation Work

The simulation of virtual reality features an EPR source that sends Bob and Alice the maximum number of maximally entangled photon pairs in the Bell's state. Additionally, the detectors' and polarized beam splitter's rules were concerned.

The tools of built software can be discussed as follows:wo panels were used to form Alice and Bob units, respectively. Each panel contains a group of one dimensional array to store EPR photon pairs, key, result of measurement, base of measurement, group of 2x2 dimensional matrices to form matrices of measurement, and group of 2x1 dimensional matrices used to form state of photons, where: $\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$ represent 0-state and $\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$ represent 1-state.

Group of one dimensional array was used to form the comparison result between blocks size and number of blocks, also different matrices of different dimensions were used to form: table of results (that contains columns for: number of photons, value of S,estimated error, and number of coincidence), Alice key, Bob key, permutation of bit location result, and final key for Alice and Bob. In addition to that, group ofbuttons was used to run the program.

The random number generator function (RNG) was used to produce EPR photon pairs. One of the pairsisAlice's array and the other isstored in Bob's array. Alice and Bob randomly choose the base of measurement (state of theanalyzer) by using the detection angles are: $\theta_1^a = 0, \theta_2^a = \frac{\pi}{4}, \theta_3^a = \frac{\pi}{8}$, $\theta_1^b = 0, \theta_2^b = -\frac{\pi}{8}, \theta_3^b = \frac{\pi}{8}$ and substituted these angles in the rotational matrix which is defined by: $\begin{bmatrix} \cos \theta & \sin \theta \\ \sin \theta & \cos \theta \end{bmatrix}$ $\begin{bmatrix} \cos \theta & -\sin \theta \end{bmatrix}$.

The idea of quantum superposition and single particle interference explains why the EPR photons' random paths to the 1- or 0-detector at either side of the system—which are represented here by the product of multiplying the EPR photons by the analyzer's matrix (after placing them in a 1x2 matrix)—are justified.

When comparing their bases of measurement (state of the analyzer), Alice and Bob divided the data into two groups: the first group, which was used different bases of measurement to determine the Bell's parameter (S).

$$
S = E(\Phi_1^a, \Phi_3^b) + E(\Phi_1^a, \Phi_2^b) + E(\Phi_2^a, \Phi_3^b) - E(\Phi_2^a, \Phi_2^b)
$$

The second group: contains the outcomes of Alice and Bob using identical measurement bases. It represented by a quantum transmission raw that is used in the error-reduction stage as shown in Fig. 2. Bell's parameter and quantum bit error rate (QBER)(e), [17] are actually connected by the fact that a decrease in the latter (toward minimum or eavesdropping) corresponds to an increase in the former (toward Bell's inequality violation). In particular, the following relates the maximum violation of Bell's inequality to QBER [4,17]:

$$
S\big|_{\text{max}} = \left\{ \frac{2\sqrt{2}, E \text{veis} \text{absent}}{(1 - 2e) \cdot 2\sqrt{2}, E \text{veis} \text{present}} \right\} \tag{24}
$$

Fig. 2. A simplified flowchart for the simulation

3. RESULTS

The system run from (500-10000) EPR photon pairs (500) in each step he relation between Number of EPR photon pairs &Number of coincidences is plot in Fig. 3 Number of EPR photon pairs & Bell parameter|S| is plot in Fig. 4 and Number of EPR photon pairs & innocent error E is plot in Fig. 5 respectively.

4. DISCUSSION

It given and explored how the number of EPR photons affected the number of coincidences and the values of the Bell's parameter. The sum of the coincidence counts for the Bell-CHSH analyzer orientation combinations at various reliable detection clicks is the total coincidences, or R. Fig. 3 shown how the number of total coincidences consistently rises as the number of EPR pairs increases Taking the extremes for example, (R=156) in Run (1) for (PH.No=500 EPR pairs), while it reaches its higher value in the state (R=3263) in Run (20) for the high value of EPR pairs number (PH.No= 10000 EPR pairs). In reality, after a quantum transmission has been completed, Alice and Bob begin their computations of the Bell parameter and count the total number of coincidences. The rise in EPR pairs in Fig. 4 makes it easy to see the tiny

Fig. 3. A plot diagram of the number of total coincidences R versus the number of EPR photon pairs

Fig. 4. A plot diagram of the Bell parameter, S, versus the number of EPR photon pairs

Mustafa et al.; Phys. Sci. Int. J., vol. 6, no. 8, pp. 55-64, 2022; Article no.PSIJ.95881

Fig. 5. A plot diagram of innocent error E versus No. of EPR photon pairs, Effect of point wise privacy amplification parameter

alterations (stability) in the Bell parameter. Taking the extremes for example, (S=2.435) in Run (3) for (PH.No=1500 EPR pairs), while it reaches (S=2.369) in Run (20) for the high value of the number of EPR photon pairs (PH.No = 10000 EPR pairs). These results were obtained without Eve's presence. One can notice clearly the small mutations (stability) in innocent error with the increase in EPR pairs in figure (5), Take the extremes for example, (E=0.975) in Run (1) for (PH.No=500 EPR pairs), while it reaches (S=0.341) in Run (20) for the high value of number of EPR pairs (PH.No= 10000 EPR pairs). These results were taken in absence of eavesdropper. From previous studies: eavesdropper. From previous studies: Ignatovich., [23] said that 'a final check of two versions of quantum mechanics with individual and entangled photons it is required an experiment with parallel aligned crystals and rare pulses of the photon pairs, where each pair is marked by the time of registration concerned with this study.

From [24] We have demonstrated the principle of operation of QKD. We have shown how one can use the properties of the laws of quantum mechanics to allow the legitimate parties to share a secret key. In particular, we have shown that the eavesdropper cannot guess the output or outcome from the legitimate parties and gain more than half of the information being transmitted. This means that the key generated by quantum cryptography is always secure, thus showing the power of quantum mechanics in securing information that agreed with present study [25] Quantum key distribution is clearly an

unconditionally secure means of establishing secret keys. Combined with unconditionally secure authentication, and an unconditionally secure cryptosystem. The major difference of quantum key distribution is the ability to detect any interception of the key, whereas with courier the key security cannot be proven or tested. QKD system has the advantage of being automatic, with greater reliability and lower operating costs than a secure human courier network.

The obtained result in this work agree with experimental result study by F Basso Basset [26] in the same range.

Daylight entanglement-based quantum key distribution with a quantum dot source

5. CONCLUSIONS

From the results of the simulation, we concluded:

Total coincidences of the Bell – CHSH analyzer angle combinations increase with increasing of EPR pairs, Bell's parameter $|S| \leq 2\sqrt{2}$ was verified in case of no eavesdropping. It was clear from the results that $\left| S \right|$ values were stable when EPR pairs were increased; there was a small random change in the expected error rate (estimated by Alice and Bob after quantum transmission stage before beginning the error elimination stage) in case of no eavesdropping when EPR pairs were increased.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

All data underlying the results are available as part of the article and no additional source data are required.

COMPETING INTERESTS

Authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

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